Economic conditions following World War I had created unemployment, housing shortages, and wasted production capacity. Hoover believed govemment had the ability, in cooperation with its citizenry, to expedite and promote economic recovery; he also believed Commerce was the proper administrative department for such a task?
Hoover accepted the post only on the condition that he would be given a "voice on all important economic policies o f the administration,'" even those involving other departments withim the cabinet. Hoover critic Walter Liggett"' noted during the 6rst year of his secretariat that "Hoover is Secretary of Commerce and assistant secretary o f everything else."" SeQ&uy Hoover began his newjob, as National Bureau of Standards (NBS) historian Rexmond Cochrane described him, "determined to recover the Nation, singlehandedly [sic] ifnecessary, from its wartime splurge, its consequent depletion of resources, and the general economic demoralization into which it had pl~nged."'~ The Role of Government in Business The new Secretary moved quickly, implementing reforms based on his concept of an "American System:' or what Ellis Hawley termed Hoover's philosophy of an "Associative State."" His "American System" favored a small government that worked with groups of associations, o r "associationalism," to bring about emomic efficiency through cooperation and national planning. Hoover's political t h i i i n g during his term of office would redefine the relationship between government, American business a n d foreign trade. At its core lay "American Individualism," a Hooverian philosophical viewpoint that perceived the United States to be unique among nations.
It springs i?om something infinitely more enduring; it springs tom the one source of human progress--that each individual shallbegiven the chance and stimulation for development of the best with which he has been endowed in heart and mind; it is the sole source of progress; it is American individualism." Hoover believed that the United States had begun a transition toward a monopolistic and autocratic economic state during the late nineteenth century. U~estrained individualism, coupled with Adam Smith's theory of capitalism, and the laissez faire policies of the Federal government had created this climate. Autocracy, to Hoover, implied that only a few in society were endowed with the Aviation, Herberf Hoover and His "American Plan" wisdom and ability todecide the economic fate ofthemany, thereby creating social classes such as those found in Europe. Hoover disdained the notion that labor and management should be considered social classes and that labor was no more than a "commodity." Instead heviewed both labor and management as "producers," believing that both management and labor should work together for the benefit of all. His work included a crusade to ban child labor and the twelve-hour workday as well as to ensure labor was guaranteed the right to collective bargaining. American Individualism embodied cooperation, selfregulation, a mutual purpose of responsibility and "service to our fellow^."'^ Correcting the movement toward autocracy required governmental r d a i n t of industry in the form of law and regulation. Hoover sought balance. The individual must be given oppormnity to rise to his potential, but business must be regulated to insure fair competition and obviate market domination16. "Regulation toprevent domination andunfair ~ractices, yet preserving rightful initiative, are in keeping with our social foundations."" An essential component of the associative state required a synthesis of "institutional" self-regulation, national oversight and planning. Hoover believed in the importance of individual creativity and private initiative, and it was this individualism that stimulated new industries. Historically, as industries founded in individualism began to mature, they affected the national economy in a '%aphazard" way. Haphazard development created waste and disrupted the economy. Waste contributed to the 'booms and slumps" inherent in the business cycle a n 4 with it, unemployment and bankruptcies. At the point where such industries interfered with tiee competition on a national scale, regulation was required. Government, through oversight, conferences and industrial selfregulation, would maintain a climate of competition, effect an increase in efficiency, reduce wasteand conserve limited resources. It would also mitigate the effects ofthe business cycle. Hoover preached the proper place for this coordiiation rested withii theFederal Government, but not a government whose sole purpose was purely regulatory. Instead, it would also be one of word'iation and cooperation-peration between trade associations, industries and labor. In other words, it should be a govemmentthat recognizesthesuperiority ofindividualism while cooperating with and regulating business and indushy. The results of this synergistic relationship would Aviation, Herbert Hoover and His "American Plan" produce an ever-higher standard of living for its citi~ens'~.
"There, however, arises a time when this haphazard development must be coordinated in order secure its best results t o the nation as a whole,"19 he told an audience of miniig engineers in 1920.
Nationalizing industry was not his goal, nor did he believe that direct control or operation of business should be placed in the hands of bureaucrats. Even though the railroads had been nationalized during the war, he advocated oversight be speedily returned to the owners. Under his swetariat he was able to report to the President in 1926 that the railroads had increased in eEciency, profits and rolling stock. Later he wrote that the benefit enjoyed by the nation, which resulted &om this "elimination of waste," was attributable, in part, to his policy of co~peration.~~ The Purpose of Bureaucracy Hoover visualized a responsive bureaucracy, working with and not against business. Its role was to be one of orchestrating teamwork and becoming the focal point for planning and problem solving. Government should work with industry, trade associations and labor to establish national policy and promote cooperation and volunteerism among competitors and even between labor and management. To accomplish these goals during his tenn of office, Hoover expanded the regulatory role of the Department ofCommercealong with its sphereofinfluence and bureaucra#'. The new Hooverian bureaucracy, as Hawley points out, was to be unique.
Its whole purpose differed. By building industrial self-government and thus reducing the need for governmental controls, it was actually checking the whole movement toward big government; and by fostering and nourishing the grassroots activities of private groups and local communities, it w a s p r o m o t i n g d e m o c r a t i c decentralization rather than bureaucratic centralismP. Swn, the label "standardization" was synonymous with ''elimination of waste," and Hoover's campaign employed a 'Three-pronged attack on waste in commerce and industry." The Bureau developed specifications, which brought increased manufacturing quality, simplified products, and standardized materials, machinery and business practices."
The Leverage of Research Research was not to be neglected. Hoover observed a relationship between pure and applied science and public policy. Pure scientific research, as he saw it, was the "raw material ofapplied science." Basic research was important, and he was committed to its fundig. As chairman of the National Academy of Sciences, Hoover sought between $10,000,000 and $20,000,000 in 1926 for the purpose of funding American research universities over a ten-year period. The NBS was to conduct "industrial" research that included investigations intoradio interference, propagation of radio waves and radio direction finding for navigation. During bis administration, the Bureau made significant progress in scientific research that positively impacted industry?
The Results Leaders of industry and labor applauded the new Department of Commerce that emerged during Hoover's sexetariat. The Chief of the Statistical Research Division, E. Dana Durand, reported great strides in national efficiency in theDeparhnentYs 1927 report tothe President. Indwxywas becoming moreefficient and prosperous. "The progress in efficiency is brought into sharp relief by comparing the increase in the product of agriculture, mining, manufactures, and railways with increase in the number ofpersonsemployed in these branche~,"~hewrote. 
Aviation, Herbert Hoover and H i s "American Plan"
Magnus Alexander, President of the National Industrial Conference Board, also gave praise. "Mr. Hoover's effective cooperation with industryin encouraging stability and efficiency and in eliminating waste is too well known to require further emphasis." Walter Ctuysler, Chrysler Corporation said, "He is a national benefactor, and American business has reason indeed to be highly indebted to him." G. E. Tripp, Chairman, Westinghouse said, "His great achievement has been to establish a new and better relationship between government and business." C. L. Reierson, President, Remington Arms Company said, 'The Department of Simplified Practice, operating under theable direction of Secretary H o w , has made long strides in eliminating wasteful duplication manuicture." And so the praise continued. The article contained the testimony of 59 leaders in American industsy; all praising Hoover for his programs, insight, ability and accomplishments as Secretary of Cornmere?'. Henry Ford endorsedHoover for president in 1928 because "Mr. Hoover is expected to be a great and forward-leading President because he is a national engineer who understands the machinery of the national li~eliood."'~ Hwverian Culture
Hoover's vision for the merit of Commerce was the efficient, fair administration of the economic and social well-being ofthe nation. His Department was to become an example of associationalism-not individualism, nor collectivism and neither socialism nor monopolistic capitalism. Instead it was to serve ultimately as the arbiter, "for harmoniously functioning, selEregulating economic units."39 "Progress," he said during his presidential inaugural address "is born of woperation in the community-not 6om governmental restraints. The Government should assist and encourage these movements of collective self-help by itself moperating with them.'-Aviation's Legislative Mandate-The Air Commerce Act of 1926 The Promise of Regulation. Commercial aviation existed in the "chaos of laissez %wee*' when Hoover was sworn in as Secretary of Commerce. William MacCrackeP, who would become the first Assistant Secretary for Aeronautics, pointed out that for the most part, the public was "still blind to aviation's tremendous potential for transforming ow travel customs and enriching our industry,'' many believing that aviation was "somewhere between a sport and a sideshow.'" Colonel Hiram Bingham," wbo as a Senator from Connecticut would later play a pivotal role in bringing about aviation legislation, argued in 1920 that the high, preWorld War I death rate of well-known aviators had dampened popular support for commercial aviation. The war, he said, had injectednew life into aviation's prospects with popular visions of American aircraft ovenvhelming German Forces.
Delays and lackluster industry performance had discouraged public support, and, by 1918, the 'inan in the street threw his aviation ideals overboard, shrugged his shoulders, and decided that somebody had sold him a gold bri~k.'"~ But Bingham articulated a concept held by many in government and business, that the development of the industry was important for commerce and its advancement as a commercial entity was vital to the American military and national "aerial defense." He called for a Department ofAeronautics and called for support in the development of aids to navigation, meteorological services and airports. "Whose business is it to do all these things?"' The answer, Bingham believed, lay in a D e p m e n t ofAeronautics that would be tasked with fostering the industry.* The E m of Laissez Faire Capitalism Bingham's description of the state of aviation in 1920 was a fair account. The government had done nothing to encouragethe application of aviation in commercenor had it established any type of regulatory environment to cultivate its development. The aircraft industry, which had produced an abundance of military airmall, found itself flooded with surplus airplanes such as "lennys" and de Havilland DH-4s, as well as discharged military aviators lookmg for flying work. Military airmatt, designed and built for combat, were ill-suited for conunercial applications. Pilots bought the surplus aircraft and began looking for ways to earn a living. About the only work available for a recently discharged aviator with a surplus Army airplane was barnstorming--giving rise to the term "gypsy flyer." Gypsy flyers traveled fiom town to town performing stunts and offering rides to those willing to risk it. It was laissez faire capitalism at its finest with competition so vigorous that most pilots found it hard to keep body and soul together. The gypsy flyer thrilled audiences with daredevil stunts but did little to advance the cause of commercial aviation. In 1922, as President Harding was dedicating the Lincoln Memorial, an aviator ''buzzed" the aowd attending the ceremony. The dangerous stunt, while raising the ire of the spectators and officials, was not illegal. 'Dangerous to the extreme:' noted The Literary Digest, this incident illustrated the need for "national air laws.'*'
Many Americans began thinkmg of flying as extremely hazardous, a sport meant for the wealthy or risk-taker, having no real commercial application. Not all saw it that way, however. There were those who believed government regulation would bring about safety and an orderly environment for the development of aviation. These missionaries of wmmercial aviation began preaching a gospel ofregulation. Without safetyregulation, the causeof wmmercial aviation wuld not a d~a n c e .~ Early Attempts Aerial advertising, photography and crop dusting were a fav of the early attempts at commercializing aviation. The Department o f Agriculture &st experimented with crop dusting in 1919, but the fatality of its only pilot in August forced the Department to discontinue its experiment. Shortly after, the State of Ohio successfully experimented with the concept of aerial spraying and inspired the Agriculture Department to once again take up flying. Some pilots found work by transporting cargo, but by far themost lucrative use o f aviation, during prohibition, was the transportation o f bootleg liquor tom Canada and Mexico. Laissez faire meant governmental non-interference, The government did not provide regulations for the proper maintenance o f aircrak licensing ofpilots, or manufacture of aircrafi, nor did it fimd the development of an infiastruchue to support the safe and orderly movement of aircraft. The policy of non-interference impeded the development of the industry, and for many years, it would remain uncoordinated and unsafe, its prospect as a viable transportation mode que~tionable~~.
The public and political aviation regulation debate spanned the years between 1918 and 1925 and gave rise to more than 25 investigations. While there had been an "excessive" number of inquiries, "something can yet be accomplished by further investigation" William P.
MacCracken remarked during an address to the Law Club in December 1925. He reported that there were five major aeronautical investigations in progresss0. Of the five he described, one would prove to be propitious, the President's Aircraft Board. Interestingly, the conclusions ofmany ofthe inquiries did not question whether aviation should be regulated, rather, how it should be regulated. Even the industry itself, manufacturers and operators alike, understood the Aviation, Herbert Hoover and His "American Plan" advantages of Federal oversight. In this the industry was unique. Responding to a letter from Representative Fredrick C. Hicks (R-NY), Hoover replied, "It is interesting to note that this is the only industry that favors having itself regulated by the Government."
In the past, other industries and interest groups had sought regulation of one another. Such had been the case when the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was formed in 1887. The creation oftheICC, according to political scientist Deborah Stone, was the result of interest group pressure whose goal was to ensure that the "interests of railroads, manufkcturers, and h e r s " were "balanced."s1
How commercial aviation was to be regulated was a source of debate that not only slowed legislative action, but also ultimately defined it. Commercial aviation was to be advanced for two important reasons--commercial transportation and national security. The wedding of commercial and military aviation was never questioned.
The argument was simple. In order to provide an adequate military industrial base with trained pilots and mechanics, the wmmercial aviation industry must be strong. National defense would benefit by a flourishing commercial aviation industty because of the inaeased manufacturing capacity, trained pilots and aircraft reserves. ' "The saving in direct govwnmental expenditures would be enom~ous,"~~ said Hoover in a New York Times interview. Acting Secretary of War, Dwight Davis, said in testimony before the President's Aircraft Board, that "it is recognized that the transportation facilities of a nation are a vital dement in its defense organization.""
The major issues surrounding the political controversy did not question the military-civilian connection, rather they had to do with where a newly aeated bureaucratic structure should reside within The Chamber of Commerce wmmented: "Commercial aviation, struggling for nearly three years without the assistance of a national policy, found an intelligent and sympathetic fiiend in the Harding administration."" Action, in the form of a bill, followed quickly. It proposed to place regulatory responsibility for aviation in the Department ofcommerce, and those in the industry and in the administration began looking to Hoover for guidance.
On March 23, just 17 days a h he assumed the secretariat, Hoover received a letter fiorn Dr. Charles Walcott, Chairman ofthe National Advisov Committee for Aeronautics (NACA)" outlining the NACA's position for the advancement of wnunercial aviation and a synopsis of two aviation bills before Congress. Under the NACA proposal, the Departments of War and Navy would retain control of their individual air-arms. The NACA would continue its mission as focal point for "aeronautical activities" and "direct continuous prosecution of scientific research in aeronautics" while a Bureau of Aeronautics would be created within the Department ofCommerce. The NACA considered commercial aviation tobe'the backbone of military prepa~edness.''~~ On April 1, a special committee of the NACA drafted a letter for the President's signature. The President signed the letter that directed Walwtt to form a subcommittee of the NACA to "take up vigorously and l l l y the question of Federal regulation of air navigation, [and] air routes to cover the d o l e United States." The subcommittee was to be wmprised of representatives fiorn the Departments of War,Navy, Commerce, Post Office and "civil life."Hoover assigned Dr. Samuel Stratton, head of the Bureau of Standards, tothe committee. TheDepartment ofcommerce was now "officially" involved in defining an American system of regulation, and it was able to make known its position and influence policy outcomes59.
Early in his secretariat, Hoover developed seven policy objectives that formed the core of his proposed aviation legislation. The first was a national airway system supported by the Federal government. Second, Hoover understood it was necessary to subsidize the new transportation system by using it to canythe mail. H i s third objective was to create a strong commercial industry thereby providing an " a d i to defense." Fourth, an increase in safety would result 6om the licensing and regulation of aircraft and pilots. He believed the government had no busiias in the '%usinas" of flight; therefore, he called for shifting responsibility for airmail service 6om Post Office aircraft and pilots to private companies. He also understood the importance ofcontinued aeronautical research and development and the "creation of a governmental agency to conduct these services." While Hoover did not believe government should be directly involved in commercial aviation, he did believe that government had a role to play in its development--that of fostering its growth through indirect subsidy.
The business community wasted no time. In June 1921, Hoover received a letter %om AviationandAircraft J o m l publisher L.D. Gardner, whosendas spokesman for some influential aeronautical organizations. Gardner had been asked to arrange a meeting with Hoover. The Secretary explained that those interested in the subject should take it up with the appropriate Congressional committee. If the association believed it important, he would "appoint a committee and give the matter further consideration.'" Gardner replied that if Hoover would call a meeting, the Secretary would have an opportunity to hear the opinions of the various associations. Gardner believed that some form of agreement might be reached as to themost effective way to present recommendations for aviation policy to the Congressional Committee on Foreign and Interstate Commerce. "As these matters are now before Congress, everyone hopes that you will take some definite action as early as possible,' 62 Gardner wrote.
Hoover's reply to Maurice Cleuy, Directing Governor of the Aero Club of America, agreed to a prefatory meeting with the aviation interest groups, he wrote, "there is no reason why those interested in civil aviation should not form an association for promotion of their views." Although Hoover was not yet sure that oversight of civil aviation would be ultimately placed in the Commerce Department, he said he would "welcome a committee 6om such an association.'" Luther Bell, Director of Information of the Manufacturers Aircraft Association," and Clarence Stetson, Hoover's secretary, manged the meeting on July 18 between Hoover and an association comprised of the Aero Club of America, the National Aircraft U n d e~i t e r s Association, the Manufacturers Aircraft Association and the Society of Automotive During the meeting with the industry representatives Hoover was concerned about the issue of safety and protection of "public life and property." The Secretary requested an industry survey be made of the hazards associated with unregulated flight. Second, he supported the industry representatives dratimg aviation legislation and submitting it for congressional action. The report Hoover had requested listed the cause ofaccidents between October 1,1920, and October 1,1921, and pointed to the need for Federal oversight. Additionally it listed "Six Requisites for Safe Flying," two of which were '"Nationwide weather &recasts'' and "Nation-wide chart of air routes."67 The organization drafted a bill modeled after NACA recommendations, adding a proposal that would have given the Department of Commerce jurisdiction over both inter and intrastate commerce.
" The Commerce Department, between November 1922 and June 1923, had sponsored five such conferences. These included drafting navigation and airdrome safety rules and the formulation ofsafety codes for aircraft power plants and a i r h e s n . Hoover continued his call for action in 1923, writing that commercial aviation in the United States was hlalling behind other nations and that "this method of transportation means much to our economic and social progress and every encouragement, legislative and otherwise, should be given to its de~elopment."~ The period between 1923 and 1925 saw little new legislative interest. Hoover claimed that "we carried the matter to the country as best we could; but the subject, being highly technical, had little emotional appeal." In an interview with the Boston American in October 1924, he again linked safety to the general acceptance of aviation. Assistant Secretary of Commerce, J. Walter Drake, touted the Department's policy position during a radio address broadcast on November 10, 1925, *om station WRC in Washiion, D.C. Drake explained the importance of transportation in the daily lives of all Americans and noted that aviation was a significant element in commerce and defense. While commercial aviation should not be subsidized directly it should receive assistance in the form of navigation facilities. "We must provide for lighting airways, for signal stations, for radio facilities, and for adequate weather services," he said. The American Review of Reviews articulated the issues surrounding the debate in October 1925, editorializing that the Department of Commerce could better promote aviation by providing air routes, radio stations and the "directional useof radio in air navigati~n."~ Although advocates for wmmercial aviation were vocal, the "problem" of aeronautical regulation had not yet reached a point by 1925 that it had attracted enough political attention to require congressional action. Hoover explained the lack of interest was due to the fact that "Congress is always overburdened with legislativedemands, and only those having large public support can get attention." Komons would agree. Aviation as an industry had been declining, and the subject of civil aviation had become, as political scientist John Kingdon would describe it, a "condition" and not a problemm.
There was an abundance of indicators such as the hi& accident rate among barnstormers and the general decliie in the state ofthe aviation industry. Doing something about it, however, was a &&rent issue. Kingdon points out: "F'roblems are o h not self-evident bythe indicators. They need a little push to get the attention of people in and around g~vemment."~'
The "little push" to get things moving turned out to be General Billy Mitchell, a strong and vocal proponent of a unified air service for many years, and highly crit~cal ofthe General Staff who, he believed, were "deliberately obstructing aerial development."" His criticism had become an initant to policy makers in the Army and Navy Departments as well as the administration. In September, Putnam released Mitchell's book Wtnged Defense. The book pointed out that the United States lacked an aviation policy. Mitchell was convinced the lack of such a policy was the cause of "our inefficient national military aeronautics, our underdeveloped civil and commercial aeronautics.'" Until the conditions were corrected "the au power ofthe United States will continue to flounder in the slough of aeronautical despond."84 The New York rimes reported the book's impending release commenting that Mitchell '%as struck out again at the air policies of the G~vernment."~'
As Mitchell continued his assault on a policy that had placed aviation on the political back burner, the House of Representatives appointed a committee to review the status of aviation. Its chair, Florian Lampert (R-WI), was not necessarily "fiiendlf' towardsthe Coolidgeadmiiistration and planned to give Mitchell a forum in which he wuld express his views. Mitchell favored a "Department ofAir," under which all military and civilian aviation would be placed-a concept not supported by the President. Early in Septemba 1925, the Navy airship Shenandoah, commanded by Mitchell's fkiend Zachary Lansdowne crashed. Lansdowne and thirteen others were killed. The accident occurred only days alter disappearance of three Navy aircraft that had attempted to fly 6om San Francisco to Hawaii Mitchell wuld take no more. Aviation published his comments in full. The editor noted that Mitchell's statements would "undoubtedly form the basis" of a Congressional investigatiou-they would. Thearticle, "Col.
Mitchell's StatementsofGovt. Aviation," was prophetically subtitled: 'These Contain the Assertions on Which He Expects to be Court Martialed."86 The most serious accusation was one that could not be ignored by the Army and Navy Departments or,more importantly, thehesident. "My opinion is as follows:' he wrote, '%me accidents are the direct result of the incompetency, criminal negligence and almost treasonable administration of the national defense by the Navy and War departments." 87 The New York Times editorialized that Mitchell had "wme pretty near breaking the back of what reputation he had lee." As to Mitchell's expectation of being ordered before court marital, "he certainly ought to." As & I as the Times was concerned, his words were 'hot only subordinate but incredibly foolish." "
The looming political threat of the Lampert Committee and Mitchell's public accusations compelled the Resident to focus the attention of his adminisfxation on the plight of aviation and push for legislation that rdected his aviation policy. Hoover recommended the Resident appoint a board "to consider not only the military but also all the commercial phases" ofthe aviation question. Coolidge lost n o time and within days appointed his friend Dwight D. Morrow as chairman of an administrative board "to make a study of the best means of developing and applying aircraft in national defense."* Komonspoints out Coolidge was "determined to court-martial Billy Mitchell."" The Resident's Aircraft Board, or The Morrow Board, worked quickly, calling representatives f?om the Departments of War, Navy, Post Office and Commerce. Members kom the NACA also testified.
Speaking for the Secretary of War, Dwight Davis, the Assistant Secretary underscored the point that military aviation was dependant upon a strong wmmercial aviation industry, and that commercial aviation could be developed through Federal subsidy by establishing ainvays, navigation facilities and meteorological services. Paul Henderson, former Second Assistant Postmaster General,who hadbeen in charge of developing the Air Mail Service, explained that government should continue the important work of research and development in "directional radio, and other aids t o navigation." 9'
Secretary Hoover appeared before the board on September 23, reporting toits members that wmmercial air transportation was reaching a point of self-sufficiency and could exist without subsidy with "certain minor senices" provided by the government. The government was already providing navigation aids in the form of lighting and marking channels for commercial marine navigation. It maintained waterways, published charts and provided weather and navigation information.
We have to this, I believe, a complete Aviation, Herbert Hoover and His 'American Plan" analogy in aviation. Before we can expect to develop commercial aviation we must determine the air routes tom the point of view of the best channels through the air in their relation to atmospheric conditions. We must develop a service for warnings of weather disturbance such as we have in navigation. We must prepare charts of these airways. We must secure the provision of landing fields and air ports and for marking the route.m
Regulations and provisions for licensing both pilot and aircraft must be developed, as well as inspection ofaircraft. "Without such services my belief is that aviation can only develop in a primitive way.lm Hoover's philosophy of efficiency was brought to bear when he proposed that the additional cost of providing and maintaining the required infkastructure and regulatory environment wuld bemitigated by expanding the duties of the Coast and Geodetic Survey, the Lighthouse Semce, Weather Bweau and the Bweau of Standards. The creation of a new aviation bureau would be necessary hut the cost would be minimal if the other bureaus worked together to provide the required regulatory and support structures. Government maintenance of inf?astmcture should not be considered a duect subsidy, Hoover argued, it was nomore than had been provided for marine transportati~n.~~ The Morrow Board adopted Hoover's proposals "in 111" and released its report to the President on December 2, with its recommendations in keeping with the administration's policy as well as Hoover's concept of the administrative organization. Ofparticular interest toCoolidge was that the Board believed that militaty aviation should be lee under the cognizance of each branch's air arm. The President sent the Morrow Board recommendations to Congress where Senator Hiram Bingham (R-CT) and Representative James Parker @-NY), members of the Morrow Board, championed legislation in support of the board's recommendations. Many in Congressunderstood thenexus that existedbetweenthe successofcommercial aviation and the government's role in providing an airway and communication system. In arguing for the bill, Representative Clarence Lea @-CA) pointed to the fact that the Federal govenunent had rendered such support in the encouragement of other industries. If passed, the bill would allocate funds for establishing airways by constructing ground-based navigation aids. Congressman Jonathan Wainwright (R-NY) added his support for the bill's passage, arguing that it had not gone far enough in aiding commercial aviation. Theunited States wouldnever enjoy the benefits of aviation until "we courageously face the situation and the needs of commercial aviation." He added that the statute would lend encouragement by providing navigation facilities, airways and weather information. Not all were happy with the bill however. In what was probably one of the more humorous debates in Congress, Representative George Huddleston @-AL)9s opposed the bill.
Mr. Hoover, who is already been made dictator of the radio, now with the bill becomes lord of the air. He is already lord of the waters. He is the Pooh-Bah of this administration. He is the factotum of the executive branch of our Government-its man of all work. The new aeronautical regulations that were to be promulgated by the Bureau of Aeronautics had to be written. The law vested this authority in Secretary Hoover, and MacCracken could easily have written appropriate regulations and had Hoover sign them. However, the Department of Commerce under Hoover had stressed the notion of indushy associationalism and consultations with those it regulated. This plan was to be followed by MacCracken in drafting new regulations. MacCracken sought the help of Ira Grimshaw, an assistant to the Department's Solicitor. By October the first draft of the regulations was complete. The draft was circulated for
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comment among the Post Office, Navy and Army Departments, aircraft manufacturers and others engaged in commercial aviation. Meetings were held at the Commerce Department to get feedback. Insurance companies, "fixed base operators, and little fellows all over the country,. . . gave us their ideas and feelings," said MacCracken. He desaibed the meetings as "stimulating and helphl," engendering a spirit of Ernperation. Comments and suggestions were incorporated in the regulations, and the h a 1 product represented the philosophy and concerns of both the Deparrment and the industry. As to the thornier Aviation, Herberf Hoover and His "American Plan" issue of barnstormers, MacCracken realized the new Bureau would have to "ride herd" on the gypsy flyers because "the time had come for a new k i d of aviation to emerge in this country, perhaps less colorll, but certainly more respon~ible.'"~ Hoover understood the significance of a strong commercial aviation indmhy and the far-reaching implications it would have on both commerce and national defense. He saw government's role as one of creating a regulatory climate that would foster and advance. the industry. Hoover also understood that without advanced communication and navigation aids, commercial aviation could not be wnduaed in a safe and orderly environment, and its utility as amode oftransportation would he limited. He believed that government should provide these aids and conduct research and development to continually improve them. His philosophy of associationalism and desire for an efficient regulatory structure within government fostered aviation's growth and provided the necessary structure to keep it strong. It would not be without mistakes and growing pains, but it would prove to be an effective model o f regulation. When Hoover left office to run for the Presidency in 1928, the Department of Commerce had developed25,OOO miles ofairways, and licensedover 6,400 a i r a a f t flying over 25,000,000 miles annually1"'. Writing in 73e Magazine ofBusiness in 1928, Hoover predicted that within twelve months commercial aviation activity would outpace all of Europe combined. He boasted that its development was based ' ' upon a distinctly American plan, d i £ k h g wkolly 6om those of other countries and this plan has, I believe, now been demonstrated to have a sound basis."'" Conclusion Hoover was not the sole participant in this political process spanning his secretariat, nor was he the only one lobbying aviation regulation. However, his influence was consequential and his political philosophies were mirrored in their structure and administration. Once he was empowered to regulate, his management ability and belief in efficiency, associationalism and technology ensured that the bureauuatic structure within the newly formed Aeronautics Branch and Bureau of Standards would engender a culture that promoted this new industry and produced a technologically advanced aeronautical communication and navigation system that would support all-weather flight. MacCracken called these services "essential" and, in a press release shortly after he had been sworn in as Assistant Secretary, he said:
Little commercial aviation could be organized until the fundamental semces [airways] were assured, as no commercial concern could undertake to provide these aids to navigation at its individual expense, not only because of the large preliminary out lay but because such facilities would he equally available to competitor^'^.
Now that bureaucratic structure and support was in place, advances in navigation and communication technologies would progress at a W e r pace and in a more coordinated fashion. The work wried out durimg Hoover's tenure as Secretary would soon produce an indusby supported by an airways system that enabled the growth of commercial aviation in the United States and surpassed all of Europe combined.
"Wetransformedthe [aviation] industry from purely mail carriers into an actual transportation Herbert Hoover wrote in 1934 to his former Postmaster General, Walter Brown. At the time, Brown was being investigated by the Roosevelt administration for his part in what Democratic Senator Hugo Black (D-AL) and others believed was the criminal mismanagement of the airmail contraas under the Air Mail Act of 1930. Hoover wanted the record set straight. His own administration, Hoover believed, had corrected fundamental problems in commercial aviation and had done it "in such a fashion as to make it a great ind~stry."'"~ This new industry, commercial aviation, wasborn during his secretariat. It resided in his agency and was imprinted with his political philosophy. His influence on the industry would be felt for years to come. Even though the aviation industry would eventually be regulated by other agencies, its political policies and procedures would bear the likeness of Hoover's American P1an.U
